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the man who made iris the offspring
of thaumas wasn’t far off
with his genalogy.
Plato, Theaetetus
this contribution is not intended to be a further analysis of the classical
myth in its phenomenal forms or even of its various interpretations, since it
would require a much broader treatment than that of a simple essay. on the
other hand, scholars more authoritative than me have produced ponderous and
excellent works on myth and on its function for human culture1, so here we
want to address an aspect decidedly circumscribed but at the same time more
radical. i followed two ways, from one side the phenomenological method of
epoché and from the other the Kantian one. in fact, i aim to develop an analysis
on the origin of myth or, in Kantian terms, on its condition of possibility. in
short, to use the husserlian programmatic formula, it is a matter of going to the
* this contribution is the English translation of the text of a lecture given in Catania on
June 21, 2019, during the conference “archetipi future. forme, funzioni, significati e stili nella
relazione tra Mythos e Logos”, whose proceedings have not yet been published.
1 see for instance: E. Cassirer, Filosofia delle forme simboliche, ii: Il pensiero mitico,
firenze, la nuova italia, 1964; m. untersteiner, La fisiologia del mito, firenze, la nuova italia,
1972; m. Eliade, Mito e realtà, trad. it., torino, boria Editore, 1966; f. graf, Il mito in Grecia,
trad. it., roma-bari, laterza, 1997; h. blumenberg, elaborazione del mito, bologna, il mulino,
1991; f.s. Cornford, dalla religione alla filosofia. Uno studio sulle origini della speculazione
occidentale, trad. it., lecce, argo, 2002; J.-P. vernant, Mito e pensiero presso i Greci. Studi di
psicologia storica, trad. it., torino, Einaudi, 1978; E. rohde, Psiche. Culto delle anime e fede
nell’immortalità presso i Greci, 2 voll., trad. it., bari, laterza, 1970; K. hübner, die Wahrheit
des Mythos, freiburg-münchen, verlag Karl albert, 2013 and From Myth to Reason? Studies in
the develompent of Greek Thought, cur. r.g.a. buxton, oxford, oxford university Press, 1999.
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thing itself (zur Sache selbst), but in order to succeed in this intention we must
necessarily ask ourselves the following question: why myth? that is, what
makes myth come to light? a philosophical investigation concerning myth can-
not but take its cue from a radical question, in the sense of going to the root of
what is being problematized. but the investigation of myth is necessarily relat-
ed to its relationship with logos, usually considered as the opposite or as a
higher moment of it that, translated into hegelian terms, consists in being the
result of a process of overcoming-conservation (Aufhebung). in this sense myth
is not simply denied, but rather it is preserved and relocated to a higher level.
if, as we think, this conception is correct, then it follows that myth never com-
pletely disappears, but instead passes – albeit in gradually more rational forms
– into theoretical thought (logos). therefore, from the evident relationship of
filiation existing between mythos and logos, it is natural to ask what their com-
mon origin and their common principle (in a logical sense and not simply
chronological) are. in our opinion, this is to be found in the greek word thau-
ma which, in most cases, is usually translated as “wonder” and which will be
the subject of the next paragraph.
2. Thauma as Arché of Myth and Philosophy
someone who puzzles or wonders, however, thinks
himself ignorant (it is because of this, indeed,
that the philosopher is in a way a mythlover,
since myth is composed of wonders.
aristotle, Metaphysics
if on the one hand the idea that philosophy is born from wonder is a sort of
philosophical mantra now well established, on the other hand it has been neg-
lected as the myth is born from the same wonder that, according to the well-
known Platonic-aristotelian tradition, is the source of philosophical reflection.
this allows us to better understand the relationship – historically problematic
and complex – between mythos and logos, even if we must first try to under-
stand the meaning of the term “wonder”. a classical place from which to start
is provided by Plato’s Theaetetus, where the athenian philosopher clearly
states that «this wondering of yours is very much the mark of a philosopher –
philosophy starts nowhere else but with wondering, and the man who made iris
the offspring of thaumas wasn’t far off with his genealogy»2. in a not very dis-
similar way, aristotle, in a famous quotation taken from Metaphysics, follows
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2 Plato, Theaetetus, in id., Theaetetus and Sophist, ed. C. rowe, Cambridge, Cambridge
university Press, 2015, 155d.
the Platonic point of view3: «it is because of wondering at things that humans,
both now and at first, began to do philosophy». immediately afterwards aris-
totle adds that: «someone who puzzles or wonders, however, thinks himself ig-
norant (it is because of this, indeed, that the philosopher is in a way a mythlover,
since myth is composed of wonders»4. let us now analyse the content of these
two very important quotations.
in both the greek term used is θαῦμα (thauma), generally translated as
“wonder”, although the linguistic output certainly does not reflect the much
more complex concept expressed in it and therefore its precise semantic value.
the word thauma – note the similarity with the word “trauma” – indicates not
so much a generic wonder in front of the happening of things, but rather a real
shaking. the tremor resulting from the thauma in the greek sense of the term
causes an emotional instability, so to speak, which translates into a loss of
ground under the feet, in an anguish of unbearable weight that leads man to
turn the thauma into a problem. on the other hand, also the word “problem”
comes from the greek word πρόβλημα (próblēma), which in turn refers to the
verb “pro-ballein”, which indicates not only something in front of us, but that
is thrown and then affects us. the one who, according to Plato, has traced a ge-
nealogy that is not at all bad is the poet hesiod who, in his Theogony, affirms
that iris was born from thaumas5. it is now a question of dissolving the allu-
sive character of hesiod’s verses since, as giorgio Colli wrote, as a rule
«myths give us appearances, surfaces»6 that require a considerable hermeneutic
effort. the intentional play on words used by Plato, fortunately for us, is evi-
dent yet serious and philosophically pregnant, since thaumas in greek is writ-
ten Θαύμας, whose affinity with the verb θαυμάζειν (awakening wonder) ex-
presses precisely the relationship of filiation between mythos and logos, be-
cause from wonder (Thaumas) comes philosophy, that is to say iris who, in
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3 «[…] in aristotle philosophy begins in wonder; when the philosopher is able to “see” or
“theorize” the causes, the wonder comes to an end. Plato articulatd a similar idea in the Theae-
thetus, of course, claiming that wonder and perplexity are the origin of philosophy. (aristotle no
doubt got this idea from Plato)», a.W. nightingale, on Wandering and Wondering: Theôria in
Greek Philosophy and Culture, in «arion», 9, 2 (2001), p. 46.
4 aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. C.d.C. reeve, indianapolis-Cambridge, hackett Publishing
Company inc., 2016, i, 2, 982, b12. the translation of this famous aristotelian passage is never-
theless misleading, as Emanuele severino has sharply pointed out, since the myth is not really
“made up” of things that produce wonder; rather, the myth “forms” from things that, precisely,
produce wonder. see E. severino, dispute sulla verità e la morte, milano, rizzoli, 2008.
5 see hesiod, Theogony, in id., Theogony, Works and days, Testimonia, ed. g.W. most,
Cambridge-london, harvard university Press, 2006, 265.
6 g. Colli, La sapienza greca, i: dioniso-Apollo-eleusi-orfeo-Museo-Iperborei-enigma,
milano, adelphi, 1990, p. 40.
hesiod’s mythology, represents the one who acts as a channel of communica-
tion between heaven and earth (in Plato’s language: world of ideas and sensible
world). aristotle’s quotation is also of paramount importance, marked by the
fact that he has not so much reiterated the Platonic point of view, but rather that
he has strongly highlighted the close relationship between philómythos and
philósophos, that is, between the one who loves myths and the philosopher.
the reason for this relationship can be explained precisely in the light of the
thauma from which flows myth which, although characterized by clearly imag-
inative elements, still expresses the need to give meaning to the flow of the
event (whether it is characterized by natural phenomena or not); in this regard,
luc ferry is not wrong when he states that «mythology is also and above all a
philosophy still “in the form of a story”, a majestic attempt that aims to re-
spond in a secular way to the question of good life, giving lessons of wisdom
alive and concrete, covered with literature, poetry and epics and not formulated
with abstract arguments»7.
the relationship established by aristotle between myth and philosophy is
of the greatest importance, since in doing so the stagirite affirms that both
myth and philosophy – albeit in their respective differences – find in the thau-
ma their ἀρχή. man creates myths precisely because he is struck by the thauma,
for having experienced that venerable but at the same time terrible wonder that
pushes him to cling to something that can allow him to overcome his finitude
and his mortality. but not only that. myths, in fact, are not only a remedy to
deal with death but also – more generally – to escape that anguish that is felt in
the presence of the unknown, in the face of what escapes human understanding.
but the condition of possibility of myth is still the thauma that generates it,
now as always. for this reason, man originally thinks mythically and poetical-
ly, being the substratum that supports its thoughts of mytho-poietic type. it is
no coincidence that aristotle, in his Poetics – in a passage complementary, for
the purposes of our discourse, to that of Metaphysics – states that «poetry is
more philosophical amd more serious tha history; poetry utters universal truths,
history particular statements»8. in dealing with the tragedy the stagirite assigns
to myth a role not at all marginal, because only by virtue of it the τραγῳδία is
able to provoke the thauma in the spectators, to which is added also the process
of κάθαρσις brought to completion just by means of pity and fear9. in this
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7 l. ferry, La saggezza dei miti, trad. it., milano, garzanti, 2012, p. 22.
8 aristotle, Poetics, ed. a. Kenny, oxford, oxford university Press, 2013, 9, 51b 5.
9 in this sense we can only agree with the following statements of massimo Cacciari who,
with regard to aristotle’s Poetics, writes: «Capital in tragedy is not the imitation of men, the
psychological analysis of their éthos, but the mŷthos», m. Cacciari, dell’inizio, milano, adelphi,
2001, p. 414.
sense, Ernesto grassi’s judgement on aristotelian aesthetics appears to be dif-
ficult to share, according to which it is precisely in it that «myth itself loses its
religious meaning and is broken up into “fables”, “fictions”»10.
if tragedy is able to generate thauma and therefore to cause wonder, then it
also has the capacity to produce in the spectators that shaking that will consti-
tute a fertile bathos for philosophical reflection. the sphere of ποίησις is not
only closely connected to knowledge but also – rather than representing a sepa-
rate sphere from what aristotle calls the apophantic logo – it reveals itself to be
complementary to it so as to enrich it. on the other hand, it is precisely with the
forms of mythical representation that the long, complex and stratified march to-
wards more abstract forms of representation begins. initially, as we know,
mythos and logos went hand in hand, as in the case of the famous Pythagoras,
who did not fail to give his thoughts now a symbolic-mystical appearance, now
a mathematical-ideal one. about Pythagoras Carl a. huffman stated that:
«classical studies have been torn between scholars who still uphold the greeks
as models of rational inquiry and those who emphasize the irrational in greek
culture. Pythagoras duly becomes either the first to recognize the role of math-
ematics in describing the order of nature, or a wonder-working shaman»11.
at this juncture, roberto radice asks himself «how is it possible that myth
and logos, superstitious belief and mathematical science could coexist in the
mind of one man? Was Pythagoras a mathematician or shaman, guru or scien-
tist? in truth, it would seem that the two alternatives in the sixth century bC
were not as incompatible as they are today, but in some respects complementa-
ry because at that time the perspective was not that of pure theoretical reason
but of practical reason. both mathematics with its infallible and abstract nature,
as well as rituals and faith in the afterlife with their involving fantasy, had a
single goal in common: the overcoming of the corporeal and sensitive sphere,
producing the same thaumaturgical effects on human life and distracting it
from what is mortal and precarious»12.
but the first big step, as thinkers such as vico and Cassirer have pointed
out, is taken precisely with mythical thought which, by its very nature, shows
its non-passiveness in the face of perceptions deriving from external reality,
thus going in search of both meaning and truth13 – albeit in different ways from
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10 E. grassi, Arte e mito, trad. it., napoli, la Città del sole, 1996, p. 168.
11 C.a. huffman, The Pythagorean tradition, in The Cambridge Companion to early Greek
Philosophy, cur. a.a. long, Cambridge, Cambridge university Press, 1999, p. 67.
12 r. radice, Magica filosofia. Sapere occulto e sapere illuminato nel pensiero antico e ar-
caico, brescia, morcelliana, 2018, p. 70.
13 Cfr. m. detienne, I maestri di verità nella Grecia arcaica, trad. it., roma-bari, laterza,
2008.
those of the logos14. in fact, as garin says about vico, «myth replaces concept,
the fantastic universal stands in place of the logical universal»15. since the need
for explanation is innate in man, it follows that the latter – certainly not rational
when he appears – first thinks precisely in images. this ability is undoubtedly
positive and not due to a simple whim or arbitrariness, for which myth arises
from the emotions that are later transformed into images, into symbols. in fact,
man reacted to the vision of a lightning bolt not in purely sensory terms, but in
symbolic terms, thus impressing his seal on reality and investing the latter with
meaning. this is a characteristic that can be found in all ancient civilizations,
so that Jung was able to talk about universal archetypes, even if their phenome-
nal manifestations are different: «the concept of the archetype, which is an in-
dispensable correlate of the idea of the collective unconscious, indicates the ex-
istence of definite forms in the psyche which seem to be present always and
everywhere. mythological research calls them “motifs”; in the psychology of
primitives they correspond to lévy-bruhl’s concept of “représentations collec-
tives”, and in the field of comparative religion they have been defined by hu-
bert and mauss as “categories of the imagination”. adolf bastian long ago
called them “elementary” or “primordial thoughts”. from these references it
should be clear enough that my idea of the archetype – literally a pre-existent
form – does not stand alone but is something that is recognized and named in
other field of knowledge»16. it is precisely in myth that we find what martin
heidegger called – with a beautiful expression – fragwürdig, or «what is wor-
thy of being questioned»17. this point of view was reiterated by heidegger at
the 1952 conference entitled Was heißt denken?: «this is what the myth tells
us, that is, the original saying (die Sage). his saying (Sagen) is considered the
oldest, not only because, according to the calculation of the chronology, it is
the most primitive, but because in its essence it remains, in the past and in the
future, what is most worthy of being thought»18. from the heideggerian text
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14 as vico wrote: «i am not […] of the opinion that poets delight above all in the false; on
the contrary, i dare say that these, like philosophers, follow in principle the true», g. vico,
Metafisica e metodo, cur. C. faschilli, C. greco, a. murari, milano, bompiani, 2008, p. 109.
15 E. garin, Storia della filosofia italiana, ii, torino, Einaudi, 1966, p. 948.
16 C.g. Jung, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, in id., Collected Works, iX, 1,
cur. g. adler, r.f.C. hull, new york, Princeton university Press, 1980, p. 42.
17 «das fragwürdige dagegen, das Wort jetzt streng genommen, öffnet sich uns in seiner
Würde, die von uns verlangt, daß wir ihr entsprechen, d. h. sie würdigen im fragen», m. hei-
degger, einleitung in die Philosophie. denken und dichten, in id., Gesamtausgabe, l, 2,
abteilung: vorlesungen 1919-1944, cur. P. Jaeger, frankfurt a.m., Klostermann, 1990, p. 143.
18 id., Was heißt denken?, in id., Gesamtausgabe, vii: vorträge und Aufsätze, i. abtei-
lung: veröffentliche Schriften 1910-1976, cur. f.-W. von hermann, frankfurt a.m., Kloster-
mann, 2000, p. 136.
emerges a fundamental aspect of myth, namely the fact of being the repository
of great questions such as those concerning origin, limit, justice, soul, genera-
tion, death, self-determination, technique, which without a shadow of a doubt
«attest the sticking out of philosophy from the womb of myth»19.
how can we fail to remember – to give some famous examples – Prom -
etheus, punished for sharing with mortals a gift from the gods? as Prometheus
says: «the gift i gave to mortals has yoked me in these sad necessities»20.
there is no doubt that, in this case, the symbol of fire21 is the expression of the
technical dominion over nature by man. or think of sophocles’ Antigone, where




but at nothing more than at man.
this being sails the gray-
White sea running before Winter storm-winds, he
scuds beneath high Waves surging over him
on each side;
and gaia, the Earth,
forever undestroyed and
unwearying, highest of
all the gods, he
Wears away, year
after year as his plows
Cross ceaselessly
back and forth, turning
her soil with the
offspring of horses.
[…]
he has taught himself 
speech and thoughts
swift as the wind; 
and a temperament for
the laws of towns; 
and how to escape
             In the Beginning was Thauma. on the Common origin of Mythos and Logos     269
19 g. Camuri, v. Mito, in aa.vv., enciclopedia filosofica, milano, bompiani, 2010, p.
7488.
20 aeschylus, Prometheus bound, ed. d.h. roberts, indianapolis-Cambridge, hackett Pub-
lishing Company inc., 2012, p. 7.
21 on “fire” as a keyword in classical mythology, see chapter 23 of Gilgameš e Prometeo,
in g. de santillana, h. von dechend, Il mulino di Amleto. Saggio sul mito e sulla struttura del
tempo, trad. it., milano, adelphi, 1983, pp. 367-377.
frost-hardened bedding
under the open
sky and the arrows
of harsh rain—inventive
in everything, this 
man. Without invention he
meets nothing that 
might come. only from
hades will he not 
Procure some means of
Escape. yet he has 
Cunningly escaped from
sicknesses that had 
seemed beyond his devices.
full of skills and
devising, even beyond
hope, is the intelligent 
art that leads him
both to evil and
to good22.
think also of icarus, who to escape from the labyrinth in which minos had
trapped him with his father daedalus, got up in flight with wax wings but, in
contravention of his father’s expert advice to fly in mid-air, began to taste the
daring flight and after getting too close to the sun melted his wings23; to
odysseus, who cleverly tricked the deadly sirens into tying himself to a pole
and gave proof of his self-control and therefore self-determination24. in short,
to ironically use a famous metaphor by hegel, philosophy, like minerva’s owl,
begins its flight over the twilight, when myth has already marked themes and
problems that the philosopher will be preparing to rationalize and place on the
plane of the lógos apophantikós25.
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22 sophocles, Antigone, edd. r. gibbons, C. segal, oxford, oxford university Press, 2003,
332-368.
23 see ovid, Metamorphoses, ed. W.s. anderson, norman, university of oklahoma Press,
1997.
24 as it is well-known, horkheimer and adorno do not agree with this interpretation and, in
the dialectic of the enlightenment, consider the composition of odysseus’ self still «labile and
ephemeral», m. horkheimer-th. adorno, dialettica dell’illuminismo, trad. it., torino, Einaudi,
1997, p. 56 n. 2.
25 in fact, the philosopher, in the face of the mythos, «acknowledges that he is ‘late’ and
that he has no power over the energy that his own language has produced […] – but it is with the
‘language’ of mŷthos, at the same time, that he indicates the aim of his own research: to arrive at
the idea of ideas, at the general law of the connection between subject and object, sighted and
the interesting aspect of this brief historical-conceptual reconnaissance lies
in the constant interweaving of mythos and logos in greek culture, which much
of the literature on the subject has instead underestimated or vehemently de-
nied, to the point of creating a real hiatus between myth and philosophy proper.
on the other hand, only millennia after the birth of myths has man been able to
develop forms of deductive or scientific reasoning in the aristotelian sense of
the term, given and considered that science is a knowledge that proceeds by
demonstration26. the latter aspect is in fact absent from myth, which historical-
ly appears in the form of narration and not as a discourse subjected to strict in-
ferential structures so that, to put it in the words of the schopenhauer of the
Parerga and paralipomena, «we must consider most myths as an expression of
truth intuited rather than thought clearly»27. as vernant states, memory, orality
and tradition are the «conditions of existence and survival of the myth»28;
moreover, the authentic being that philosophy wants to reach «is not the mythi-
cal supernatural, but a reality of a completely different order: pure abstraction,
identity, the very principle of rational thought, objectified in the form of the ló-
gos»29. in this sense, Cassirer is right when, in his posthumous The Myth of the
State (1946), he affirmed that modern civilization does not rest on solid foun-
dations at all, but is instead «built on volcanic soil. for its first origin and basis
was not rational, but mythical»30.
3. Mythos and Logos. Antinomic polarity or complementarity?
the common origin of mythos and logos, as already mentioned, allows us
to better understand the relationship, the weaving and, therefore, their constant
mixing. this – almost paradoxical – dependence/independence reflects the
much richer image of greek rationality, which certainly cannot be reduced to a
pure logos, formal and therefore free from any mixture with the aspects linked
to the colourful world of life. if this aspect is not adequately understood, it
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seen, at the perfectly luminous expression […] of ‘what’ makes it possible», m. Cacciari, Labi-
rinto filosofico, milano, adelphi, 2014, p. 131.
26 see aristotelis, Analytica posteriora, in id., Analytica Priora et Posteriora, ed. W.d.
ross, oxford-new york, oxford university Press, 1964, i, 2, 71b17-18.
27 a. schopenhauer, Parerga e paralipomena, ed. m. Carpitella, ii, milano, adelphi, 1998,
p. 540.
28 J.-P. vernant, L’universo, gli dèi, gli uomini. Il racconto del mito, trad. it., torino, Einau-
di, 2000, p. 6.
29 id., Mito e pensiero presso i Greci cit., pp. 394-395.
30 E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State, new haven-london, yale university Press, 1946, p.
278.
would be even more bizarre to establish some form of communication between
mythos and logos. We are referring to the famous thesis of the so-called “greek
miracle”, supported by scholars such as Eduard zeller or John burnet, in whose
opinion it would be completely wrong to find in the greece of the 5th century
b.C. the presence of oriental sapiential themes31. giovanni reale, in his monu-
mental History of Greek and Roman Philosophy, disputes – without examining
them, however – the arguments against the theses of zeller and burnet, consid-
ering the latter as «objectively incontrovertible»32. to give just one example,
the deciphering of the cuneiform writing of the theogony of the mesopotamian
people of the hurrians has made it possible to dismantle the historiographic
prejudice that greek speculation arose as a result of a miraculous event due
solely to the philosophical genius of its representatives. friedrich nietzsche, in
his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, had already questioned a simi-
lar historiographical-conceptual operation: «nothing would be sillier than to
claim an autochthonous development of the greeks. on the contrary, they in-
variably absorbed other living cultures. the very reason they got so far is that
they knew how to pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where
others had left it»33. on the literary side, however, a writer like Piercey bisshey
shelley, in the preface to his poem Hellas, stated instead – with tones that al-
most touched on racism – that «We are all greeks. or laws, our literature, our
religion, our arts, have their root in greece. but for greece – rome, the in-
structor, the conqueror, or the metropolis of our ancestors, would have spread
no illumination with her arms, and we might still have been savages and idol-
aters; or, what is worse, might have arrived at such a stagnant and miserable
state of social institution as China and Japan possess»34.
in open contrast to zeller and burnet’s thesis, francis macdonald Corn-
ford argued that the «modes of thought that in philosophy obtain clear defini-
tion and explicit formulation were already implicit in the unreflected insights
of mythology»35. on the other hand, the analogy between the Chaos of which
hesiod speaks about and the Apeiron of anaximander is evident but, as ver-
nant points out, not only does the overall scheme remain, since even in the de-
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31 see E. zeller, La filosofia dei greci nel suo sviluppo storico (1856), trad. it., i, firenze,
la nuova italia, 1932, pp. 50-51; J. burnet, early Greek Philosophy, london, a. & C. black
ltd., 1920, p. 13.
32 g. reale, Storia della filosofia greca e romana, i: orfismo e presocratici naturalisti, mi-
lano, bompiani, 2004, p. 26.
33 f. nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, cur. m. Cowan, gateway
Washington, Edition, 1998, p. 30.
34 P.b. shelley, Preface to Hellas, london, C. and J. ollier, 1822, p. iX.
35 f.s. Cornford, dalla religione alla filosofia cit., p. 43.
tails «the symmetry of developments, the concordance of certain themes indi-
cate the persistence, in physical thought, of mythical representations that have
lost nothing of their force of suggestion»36. it is sufficient to take as an exam-
ple the already mentioned anaximander, who in one of his fragments states as
follows: «a germ, pregnant with hot and cold, was separated off from the eter-
nal, whereupon out of this germ a sphere of fire grew around the vapor that sur-
rounds the earth, like a bark round a tree»37. so, in this anaximandrean frag-
ment one cannot fail to notice a glimpse of that symbolism also present in the
indo-European world, since the symbol of the tree to which anaximander
refers «brings us back […] to one of the most known and ancient symbols of
humanity, to the tree conceived as axis mundi that, from india to China, from
siberia to northern Europe, indicates the “pillar” around which the different
planes of the cosmos unfold»38.
We come to the second point of the matter, namely the reception by greek
philosophy of myths and tales from indo-European and semitic populations. in
fact, comparing the theogony of the mesopotamian people of the hurrians with
the most famous work of hesiod, we discover surprising similarities. accord-
ing to the theogony of the population of the hurrians – the so-called Kingship
in Heaven – the god of heaven anu was dethroned and castrated by his son Ku-
marbi. a perfectly similar event can be found in the theogony of hesiod,
where uranus – also god of heaven – is castrated with a scythe by his son
Chronos39. Certainly it is difficult to think of a simple coincidence, especially
if we keep in mind not only the formidable volume of 1947 by santo mazzari-
             In the Beginning was Thauma. on the Common origin of Mythos and Logos     273
36 J.-P. vernant, Le origini del pensiero greco, trad. it., milano, feltrinelli, 2007, p. 103. on
the same wavelength we find luc brisson: «We must never forget that greek science and phi-
losophy developed in a world in which the reflections of traditional thought had not completely
disappeared», l. brisson, Mito e sapere, in Il sapere Greco. dizionario critico, cur. J. brun-
schwig, g.E.r. lloyd, i, torino, Einaudi, 2005, p. 57.
37 anassimandro, in I presocratici. Testimonianze e frammenti, ed. g. giannantoni, i, mi-
lano, mondadori, 2009, fr. 10.
38 n. d’anna, Il gioco cosmico. Tempo ed eternità nell’antica Grecia, milano, rusconi,
1999, p. 114.
39 not without reasons untersteiner called Kumarbi the «hurrian Kronos», m. untersteiner,
La fisiologia del mito cit., p. 124. on these themes, see the now classic and provocative work of
m.g. bernal, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots, new brunswick, rutgers university Press,
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no40 on the ways East and West met each other, but also what E.o. James writes
in Gli eroi del mito, according to which the hurrian theogonic tale «comes
from mesopotamia, and it is not improbable that it passed in greece through
Phoenicia and Cyprus towards the middle of the second millennium b.C., and
that there it was finally transformed into theogony by hesiod who had penetrat-
ed into boeotia from north-western asia minor»41. in the light of what has just
been said, it seems evident, therefore, that «behind the theogony of hesiod is
hidden as a model the epic of Kumarbi (hinter der Theogonie hesiods stecks
als vorlage das Kumarbi-epos)»42. so, what is it that makes myths perpetual-
ly present in culture? What is it that drives people to constantly resort to it?
in the first place, as we have already mentioned, mythos shares with philoso-
phy the same arché, that is, the thauma; this means that there is nothing patho-
logical in the language of myth (as max müller and herbert spencer used
to up-hold); nor is it licit to consider myths – as voltaire wanted instead –
«absurd fairy tales that still continue to infect youth»43. rather, they constitute
an inexhaustible reserve of spiritual deposits and problems of a universal na-
ture. as Ernst Cassirer writes – with his usual expositive clarity – myth «is the
first answer given to the riddles of the universe. it attempts, albeit incompletely
and inadequately, to discover the principle and the cause of things. from this
point of view, myth appears to be the product not so much of the imagination,
but of the first intellectual curiosity of the man. myth does not content itself
with describing what things are, but follows their origins; it wants to know
why»44.
in this sense, myths, in their phenomenal manifestation, are nothing more
than symbolic expressions or images of dreams, anxieties and fears that have
always stirred man up. secondly, another element that makes myth something
not to be renounced is its multiformity and plasticity, so that we could rightly
talk about the different functions performed by mythology within the cultural
tradition of the West.
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Joseph Campbell, in his numerous works, lists four of them: that which he
defined as a mystical function, having to do mainly with the mysterium tremen-
dum et fascinans, that is qualities that man perceives as sacred and mysterious
such as to arouse wonder in him; the cosmological one, with which science al-
so has to do, but which in myth refers, however, to something mysterious; the
sociological one, where myth, incorporating the principal values of reference of
a given historical society, favoured its social cohesion45 and, finally, the peda-
gogical function of mythology, consisting in favouring the development of the
individual in integrity and in agreement with d) himself (microcosm), c) with
his culture (mesocosm), b) with the universe (macrocosm) and a) with that
marvellous last mystery which is both beyond and within itself and of all
things46.
briefly, myth operates – as spinoza would say – sub specie aeternitatis, be-
ing it out of time and therefore always actual and never actualizable. Para-
phrasing Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft, myth «occasions much thought (die
viel zu denken veranlaßt)»47 since, by virtue of an elaborate process of arche-
typing, it has been able to universalize not only models and types of behavior,
but also genuine philosophical-physical problems – albeit expressed in the
form of poetic language that take nothing away from their intrinsically theoreti-
cal significance. therefore, philosophy, rather than implementing a real
process of de-mitization, has rather logicized or “secularized” myths, taking on
the great questions they pose and placing them on the plane of the apophantic
logo. but myth does not disappear for this reason, as it is – as already men-
tioned – a-temporal and therefore a constant trait of human culture, inex-
haustible source of reflection.
it is no coincidence that in greece mythos and logos walked side by side, in
continuous dialogue in the absence of extreme prevarications. in Walter
friedrich otto’s words, logos indicates «the word from the subjective side of
thinking and speaking», whereas mythos indicates not so much something cal-
culated, pondered, but «the actual, the real (das Wirkliche und Tatsächli-
che)»48. in greek culture – despite the evident and marked attempts by philoso-
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phy to emancipate itself from mythical thought – there is no antinomic polarity
between mythos and logos, there is no prevarication between them as much as a
fruitful and never interrupted dialogue. although it was the greek philosophers
themselves who forcefully claimed the superiority of logos, it is certainly not
possible to blot out the entire structure of the great questions raised through
myths. the philosophers were well aware of the enormous debt that logos
owed to the myth, but by now they considered their work of emancipation a
necessary step to satisfy the human need for understanding and to make natural
reality free from any reference to divine forces. this process of rationalization
of myth, as already mentioned, has not consisted in making a tabula rasa of the
forms of mythical representation, rather it has preserved the philosophically
pregnant aspects transferring them to the level of the apophantic logo and using
them as authoritative sources of a cultural past to be recovered continuously.
on the other hand, it is precisely in myth that we can find the essential themes
developed later with the help of logos; for this reason we can only subscribe to
the following statements by heidegger, taken from a university course held in
fribourg in the winter semester of 1942-1943 and published under the title
Parmenides, in which we read: «“myth” and logos appear in an erroneously
much-discussed opposition only because they are the same in greek poetry and
thought. in the ambiguous and confusing title “mythology”, the words μύθος
and λόγος are connected in such a way that both forfeit their primordial
essence. to try to understand μύθος with the help of “mythology” is a proce-
dure equivalent to drawing water with the aid of a sieve»49.
from these passages of the heideggerian Parmenides emerges the need to
overcome the opposition between mythos and logos, which in fact proves to be
more apparent than real – at least in greek philosophy. starting from a com-
mon origin, mythos and logos then developed following two different but com-
plementary “logics”. the first, as Cassirer argued in his unpublished lectures
on ancient philosophy, is that of imagination and emotion, while the second
one is the so-called logic of judgment. myth is not the expression of a theoreti-
cal conception, but rather of a dramatic conception of life; therefore, writes
Cassirer, «we cannot explain myth as a mere intellectual representation or con-
ception; we must study it in its actions. mythical life is always closely connect-
ed with ritual lifr and it is the study of primitive rites which gives us the real
clue to the interpretation of mythical thought»50.
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in order to better understand the complementary relationship between
mythos and logos, it is useful to use a well-known passage from Plato’s Pro-
tagoras where the latter – in strange contrast with his aversion to homeric po-
etry – shows the identity and at the same time the difference between a mythi-
cal and a properly logical explanation. in fact, in the dialogue in question, as is
well known, socrates and Protagoras discuss about the theme of virtue and the
question of whether it can be taught or not; at that point socrates – addressing
Protagoras – affirms: «so if you can show us more clearly that excellence can
be taught, please don’t grudge us your proof, but proceed». Protagoras answers
in the following way: «Certainly i shall not grudge it you, socrates – he said.
but would you rather that i showed you by telling a story (as an older man
speaking to his juniors) or by going through a systematic exposition?». most of
the listeners asked him to respond in the way he considered most appropriate
and at that point Protagoras concludes as follows: «Well, he said, i think that i
twill be more enjoyable to tell you a story»51.
firstly, for Protagoras the demonstration can take its cue from both the
mythical and the rational side, thus highlighting the true content of myth; sec-
ondly, the preference given to the mythical explanation is not linked to a self-
referential aesthetic question, since it is a matter of exposing the truths on the
basis of a mythical narrative but that unlike a “cold” inferential reasoning is al-
so capable of arousing pleasure in the listener52. in this sense, as Konrad gaiser
has well expressed, through this claim to truth myths «complete the logos of
the investigation that proceeds through analysis and arguments»53.
4. Concluding remarks
the analysis of the common origin of mythos and logos brings to light, ac-
cording to a homonymous heidegger’s paper, their identity and difference,
since the same is the source from which spring, but different ways of approach-
ing the real. While myth, through ritual forms, gives meaning to reality, merg-
ing entirely with it and identifying in divinities the “ultimate” causes of reality,
theoretical thought no longer tolerates such forms of explanation, thus claiming
its autonomy, its ability to grasp by itself the aspects of reality. but logos, let’s
remember, often draws on myth – now as always – since it is in it that the hu-
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man need for understanding and donation of meaning manifests itself for the
first time; it is precisely the truthful content of myth that provides theoretical
thought with themes and problems that it is preparing to place on the level of
apophantic logo. Perhaps all this is equivalent to an evolutionary conception
whereby one passes from the irrationality of myth, from the fables of the an-
cients to the much more solid theoretical thought? this is not the image of
myth that we have tried to paint here, for myth is not at all an Urdummheit des
Menschen, that is, a primordial human stupidity, but rather the first and great
attempt of man to explain the happening of things, to question himself as much
on the external world as on the internal one, that is to say on himself. myth is
narration, a provider of meaning and therefore a real way of being in the world,
but in the long run one could no longer appeal to zeus or athena. the process,
albeit gradual, of emancipation of logos from mythical thought does not mean
a “death sentence” of the latter and not even a rejection of its content. Logos –
which never stops dialoguing with myth – has simply chosen a different path,
has chosen its autonomy, has chosen to ask and respond in its own way without
denying mythos its right to exist.
abstraCt
Questo contributo non vuole essere una ulteriore analisi del mito classico nelle sue
forme fenomeniche e nemmeno delle sue varie interpretazioni, giacché si renderebbe
necessaria una trattazione ben più vasta di quella di un semplice saggio. d’altra parte,
studiosi più autorevoli di chi scrive hanno prodotto ponderose ed eccellenti opere sul
mito e sulla funzione da esso svolto per la cultura umana, per cui qui si vuole affronta-
re un aspetto decisamente circoscritto ma al tempo stesso più radicale. intendiamo in-
fatti sviluppare un’analisi sull’origine del mito o, detto kantianamente, sulla sua condi-
zione di possibilità. si tratta insomma, per usare la formula programmatica husserliana,
di andare alla cosa stessa (zur sache selbst), ma per riuscire in questo intento bisogna
necessariamente porsi la seguente domanda: perché il mito? ovvero, cosa fa sì che il
mito venga alla luce?
this contribution is not intended to be a further analysis of classical myth in its
phenomenal forms, nor of its various interpretations, since it would require a much
broader treatment than that of a simple essay. on the other hand, more authoritative
scholars than the writer have produced ponderous and excellent works on myth and its
function for human culture, so that here we want to deal with a decidedly circum-
scribed but at the same time more radical aspect. in fact, we intend to develop an
analysis on the origin of the myth or, kantianamente, on its condition of possibility. in
short, to use the husserlian programmatic formula, to go to the thing itself (zur sache
selbst), but to succeed in this intent we must necessarily ask ourselves the following
question: why the myth? that is, what causes the myth to come to light?
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